Creeping Ethical Regulation and the Strangling of Research by Martyn Hammersley
Creeping Ethical Regulation and the Strangling of Research
by Martyn Hammersley
The Open University
Sociological Research Online, 15 (4) 16
<http://www.socresonline.org.uk/15/4/16.html> 
10.5153/sro.2255
Received: 25 Oct 2010     Accepted: 10 Nov 2010    Published: 30 Nov 2010
Introduction
1.1 In 2000, a major change in the institutional environment of UK social science occurred when the
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) produced its Research Ethics Framework (REF), requiring
that all institutions whose members seek funding must operate ethical regulation procedures of a
prescribed kind. The defective assumptions and dangerous implications of this new regime have been
outlined elsewhere (Dingwall 2006a and b and 2007; Hammersley 2006 and 2009). The revised version, the
Framework for Research Ethics (FRE), retains the REF’s six principles, all of which have the character of
injunctions that must be ‘implemented’, but it extends the scope of regulation in some signiﬁcant ways.
Stanley and Wise (2010) have provided a very important service in analysing the FRE; and their metaphor
of creeping extension certainly captures what is happening.
1.2 The FRE claims to offer ‘clariﬁcation’ of some elements of the REF (ESRC 2010:2 and 45), while also
being a response to ‘changing scientiﬁc agendas and policy developments’ (p2). We are told that we live in
‘a fast moving research environment’ (p2). This is, of course, the language of frenetic modernisation that
now predominates in much policy discourse, including in other ESRC documents. In this discourse,
imperatives loudly declare the need to adapt to a changing world for fear of falling by the wayside; though
what is actually required is compliance with the demands of powerful agencies of one sort or another
(Hammersley 2008:249). Not surprisingly, perhaps, this language is shot through with ambiguities and
ambivalences. For example, the discussion of gaining informed consent in the FRE suggests that
‘typically’ this should be done in written form, with agreement being ‘signed off’ by participants (ESRC
2010:28), yet only a little later we are told that ‘highly formalized or bureaucratic ways of securing consent
should be avoided in favour of fostering relationships in which ongoing ethics regard for participants is to
be sustained […]’ (p29). In another place, it is insisted that ‘innovative’ research is to be facilitated (p2),
but then researchers are instructed that ‘risks should be minimized’ (p3). Later it is recognized that ‘not all
risks can, or in some cases, should be avoided’ (p26), indeed that:
research may be ‘deliberately and legitimately opposed to the interests of the research
participants/organizations’ in cases where the objectives of the research are to reveal and
critique fundamental economic, political or cultural disadvantage or exploitation’ (ESRC
2010:27).[1]
However, on the next page we are informed that:
political sensitivities may arise when ﬁndings are contrary to local or national policy. It may
be important to publish critical ﬁndings about policies and organisations, but was this within
the original remit of the research? Were the participants aware that this could be a
consequence of their participation?
The implication seems to be that the ﬁndings of research projects must be anticipated so that those in
charge of local and national policy can be forewarned. Moreover, it seems unlikely that powerful groups, on
being told that the proposed research is ‘deliberately opposed to their interests’, would consent to access.
1.3 In many ways, the institution of the REF and its updating in the FRE parallels what occurred in the
United States, and in other countries too, with, from 1981 onwards, the Federal requirement to set up
Institutional Review Boards. There are two sorts of ‘creep’ involved, as outlined by Haggerty (2004) in his
discussion of the situation in Canada: intensiﬁcation and extension. Stanley and Wise draw particular
attention to the ﬁrst: the way in which the FRE increases the degree of ethical regulation in the domain
marked out by the REF. A previous apparent loop-hole, whereby researchers could avoid submitting their
proposals to an ethics committee on the grounds that no signiﬁcant ethical issues are involved, has been
closed. The only exemptions now are research that relies entirely on data which is already in the public
domain (ESRC 2010:11), and projects that are ‘not considered “research”’, these being listed as ‘routine
audit, performance reviews, quality assurance studies, testing within normal education requirements, and
literary or artistic criticism’ – a motley and puzzling set of exceptions. At the same time, it is made clear
that ‘student research should be treated in the same manner as all other research and subject to ethics
review’ (p46), this including research projects undertaken by undergraduates and those on taught
postgraduate courses (p19). In short, few research projects will now be able to escape ‘ethical scrutiny’ bycommittee.
1.4 Another aspect of the intensiﬁcation of regulation is that ‘ethical review’ is no longer a matter of gaining
approval to go ahead with a project – it is now expected to continue throughout the course of the research.
The FRE states that ‘the principal aim of ethics review is, as far as possible, to protect all groups involved
in research: participants, institutions, funders and researchers throughout the lifetime of the research and
into the dissemination process’ (ESRC 2010:2 emphasis added). Indeed, in the case of projects involving
an ‘emergent design’ – which includes most qualitative work and, it might be argued, most good research –
an advisory committee must be set up to deal with ethical issues as they arise. Point 1.11.2 of the FRE
states that: ‘Where a study design is emergent, the REC [Research Ethics Committee] should agree
procedures for continuing ethics review (for example through a Project Advisory Group) […] as a condition
of approval’ (ESRC 2010:17 emphasis added).
1.5 The other sort of ethics creep sponsored by FRE concerns what is included under the heading of
‘ethics’. Once again this spreads out from the REF, and from what has happened in its wake in many
institutions. Of particular signiﬁcance is that the FRE now includes reference to ‘research integrity’, indeed
the UKRIO (UK Research Integrity Ofﬁce) ‘research integrity checklist’ is incorporated into Appendix A of
the FRE. Meanwhile, in the body of the text it is stated that:
there is a clear link between governance and ethics. The RCUK [Research Councils United
Kingdom] Research Conduct and Research Integrity Policy has now been released which
brings together questions of research integrity and research ethics, and therefore overlaps
with aspects of the current ESRC REF. The revised framework compliments [sic] this policy
to promote good practice and governance of research. (ESRC 2010:44)
In this way, the scope of regulation is now explicitly extended to include virtually all aspects of the
research process. Speciﬁcally, the topic to be investigated must be judged sufﬁciently worthwhile to
warrant the risks likely to be involved, and the research design must be validated as effective. The
question that arises here, as elsewhere, is how any ethics committee could have the expertise to make
sound judgments about these matters, even were it to be accepted that they have the authority to do so.
As in other spheres, what is involved is deprofessionalisation in the name of a new professionalism: one
that requires compliance with ‘good practice’ laid down in frameworks speciﬁed by government bodies and
organisational managements.
1.6 This is part of a wider process: the extension into new areas of the sort of ‘research governance’
developed in the ﬁeld of health, signalled by publication of the Research Governance Framework for Health
and Social Care in 2001 (Department of Health 2005), and the establishment of the National Research
Ethics Service in 2007, which consolidated the organisation of ethics committees within the National
Health Service. The extension of research governance to universities is also part of the increasing
‘strategic management’ of research prompted by pressure to compete more effectively for funds through
the Research Assessment Exercise and its successor, and for external funds from other sources. This has
involved organisational legislation of research priorities, and the introduction of increasingly bureaucratic
devices to monitor and direct academic research, and to maximize its ‘impact’, at least in the sense of
ﬁnancial return.
1.7 This, of course, reﬂects the slow shift from universities being relatively independent of both
government and commerce, and organized on a collegial basis, towards their being treated as part of the
‘national economy’, and increasingly run in a managerial fashion that apes the private-for-proﬁt sector. It
forms part of the ‘new public management’ attack on professionalism in the name of ‘transparent’
accountability, guided by the idea that the public sector must be made accountable to tax payers in a
similar way to that in which commercial ﬁrms are to their shareholders. This has resulted in greatly
strengthened managerial structures within many UK universities, and it is not surprising that the FRE
requires that ‘the authority of [an ethics committee] be delegated through the institution’s usual governance
procedures’ (ESRC 2010:10); though in a further outbreak of ambiguity it is insisted that, at the same time,
they must be ‘free from bias and undue inﬂuence from the institution in which they are located’ (p11).
1.8 The change in the character of universities that lies behind all this can be traced a long way back in the
UK: to the transformation of the old University Grants Committee into HEFCE and its associates, this
representing a switch in the nature of this organization from an independent buffer into an arm of
government. There has also been a transformation of the ESRC itself, from an organization that was
relatively independent of government to one that is explicitly geared to pursuing national goals. This too
can probably be tracked back to an institutional name change: from Social Science Research Council
(SSRC) to ESRC. Behind the scenes, relations with government have played a powerful role in shaping
ESRC policies and procedures in recent years, despite resistance and insistence that the organisation’s
perceived independence must be preserved.
1.9 All this leads to a pessimistic conclusion about Stanley and Wise’s call for opposition to the FRE, and
to earlier pleas in the wake of the REF, including my own. The chances of successfully resisting the creep
of ethical regulation are low given that it is part of a much wider shift in the whole character of universities,
and of the research that is carried on within them (Hammersley 2010). Moreover, the extension of ethical
regulation is lubricated by an ideology that is hard to challenge. This assumes, rightly, that there are
genuine ethical concerns associated with social research, but exaggerates them, and also assumes,
wrongly, that these can be eliminated or minimised through establishing accountability regimes. It is
striking that the FRE formulates ethics in terms of ‘protecting’ all involved from the ‘risks’ associated with
research through demanding ‘compliance’ with ‘good practice’. As already noted, there is an exact parallel
here with similar ventures in other parts of the public sector where ‘transparent accountability’ regimes
have been set up in order to deal with problems or to ‘ensure’ improvement. The fact that, generally
speaking, these policies have failed to achieve their goals – and have, generally, undermined good practice
and commitment to it – does not terminate belief in the driving ideology. People want to believe that
accountability procedures work, because they ﬁnd the alternative – trusting professional judgment –
unacceptable. Such distrust derives from a deep-seated problem in large, complex societies, where there
is unavoidable reliance upon anonymous strangers for even the most basic goods and services; one that
has been exacerbated by globalization, and by huge growth in the advertising and public relationsindustries. Researchers have themselves been drawn into the resulting, now endemic, sophistry in order to
pursue external funds effectively, and in efforts to maximize the impact of their ﬁndings, build reputations,
and establish their own authority in the public sphere.
1.10 An associated problem in countering the ideology is that what is at issue is a matter of degree and
appropriateness. Few of us would deny that close regulation of research trialling new drugs is required. The
point is that social research, generally speaking, involves nothing like the same degree of intervention by
researchers or the same danger of serious harm. However, it is always possible to heighten judgments of
the likely severity of ethical problems in social research, and some social scientists do this themselves.[2]
The result is that there often appears to be the same need for regulation here as there is in medicine. A
sense of proportion is required, but this requires reliance on sensible judgment, which is precisely what is
not trusted. The tempting alternative is the appeal to criteria, standards and procedures, since these carry
the illusion of offering guarantees, at the very least in terms of identifying who is to blame when things go
wrong. The increasing regulation that results, alongside the growing difﬁculties that social scientists face in
gaining access to people and places in order to collect data, threatens the future existence of good quality
social research in many ﬁelds.
Notes
1 The quotation within the quotation here is from the Canadian Tri-Council Policy Statement.
2For an early example see Warwick 1982.
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